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Abstract: In the semantic debate about plurals, pluralism is the view that a plural
term denotes some things in the domain of quantification and a plural predicate de-
notes a plural property, i.e a property that can be instantiated by many things jointly.
According to a particular version of this view, untyped pluralism, there is no type
distinction between objects and properties. In this article, I argue against untyped
pluralism by showing that it is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument put
forth by Timothy Williamson and that it clashes with a plural version of Cantor’s the-
orem. I conclude that pluralists should postulate a type distinction between objects
and properties.
1 Introduction
It is generally agreed that, even for the purpose of regimenting basic constructions
involving natural language plurals, a first-order language is inadequate (see Boolos
1984, Lewis 1991, Schein 1993, Higginbotham 1998, Yi 1999, 2005, Oliver and
Smiley 2001, Rayo 2002, and McKay 2006). A more suitable regimenting language
can be obtained by expanding the standard language of first-order logic to include
plural terms and quantifiers, plural predicates, and a relation of plural membership
corresponding to the natural language ‘being one of’. However, the mere choice
of a regimenting language leaves a fundamental semantic question wide open: how
should the semantic interpretations of that language be specified?
Pluralism is the view that, in any interpretation of the language, a plural term tt
denotes some things in the domain of the interpretation, whereas a plural predicate P
denotes a plural property. A plural property is one that can be instantiated by many
things jointly. To use Frege’s example, although he did not endorse pluralism, ‘laid
the foundations of spectral analysis’ stands for a plural property jointly instantiated
by Bunsen and Kirchhoff. In contrast, the property of being prime is singular in
that it is instantiated separately by each prime number. So, for the pluralist, a plural
predication of the form P(tt) is true in an interpretation if and only if, relative to that
interpretation, the things denoted by tt jointly instantiate the property denoted by P.
Among philosophers, though not among linguists, pluralism has now become
the most prominent view about how to specify semantic interpretations for lan-
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guages containing plural expressions (Yi 1999, 2005, 2006, Hossack 2000, Oliver
and Smiley 2005, and McKay 2006). The main alternative to pluralism is standard
set-theoretic semantics, which can be naturally extended to plurals by interpreting
plural terms as denoting non-empty subsets of the domain of quantification and by
interpreting plural predicates as denoting sets of subsets of the domain. But this set-
theoretic approach and its variants have been found to be unsatisfactory on two main
grounds. First, since plural terms are taken to denote sets, the semantics introduces
ontological commitments which are arguably absent in ordinary discourse. (For a
dissenting voice, see Resnik 1988.) Second, by requiring that the domains of quan-
tification be set-sized, the set-theoretic approach rules out any interpretation whose
domain is too big to form a set. As a result, the set-theoretic approach is unable
to capture all the intuitive interpretations of the language, such as those in which
the domain of quantification contains absolutely everything. This is especially prob-
lematic if, as in the case of plural logic with standard semantics, the completeness
theorem fails, and thus there is no assurance via Kreisel’s squeezing argument that
the mere appeal to interpretations with a set-sized domain yields an extensionally
adequate relation of logical consequence (see Kreisel 1967 and, among others, Rayo
and Williamson 2003).
Pluralism seeks to remedy both problems. It dispenses with the idea that a plural
term denotes a set of things by taking it to denote plurally the things themselves.
Moreover, as will be clear from a more detailed presentation of the semantics, plu-
ralism can capture intuitive interpretations in which the first-order quantifiers range
over absolutely everything. However, pluralism is not a uniform camp. There are
two versions arising from two alternative conceptions of property.
According to the first conception, properties are simply objects of a special kind,
i.e. objects that can be instantiated by other objects. Thus there is no type distinction
between objects and properties—properties are untyped. Some pluralists, such as
Hossack (2000) and McKay (2006), have combined pluralism with this conception of
property. We call their view untyped pluralism. According to the second conception,
there is a type distinction between objects and properties. Properties are not objects
but higher-order entities that can be predicated of objects. Other pluralists, such as
Oliver and Smiley (2005) and Yi (2005, 2006), have combined pluralism with the
second conception of property. We call their view typed pluralism.
Untyped pluralism has a lot of initial appeal. First, it forgoes higher-order logic,
avoiding common misgivings about its legitimacy. In contrast, typed pluralism is
unconventional: it requires the acceptance of higher-order logic in addition to plural
logic. This means abandoning the proposal famously championed by Boolos to use
plural logic to tame second-order logic (Boolos 1984, 1985, and Rayo and Uzquiano
1999). Second, the conception of property underlying untyped pluralism may seem
metaphysically preferable. For instance, one may regard the postulation of a funda-
mental distinction between objects and properties (i.e. particulars and universals) as
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a metaphysical dogma and thus regard the introduction of a type distinction as un-
justified (MacBride 2005). Moreover, our ordinary way of talking about properties
provides little evidence for such a distinction: we commonly nominalize predicates
and take first-order quantifiers to range over the semantic values of those nominal-
izations. Furthermore, if properties are to combine with objects to form propositions
or facts conceived as complex objects, then properties must be of the same type
as objects. Finally, introducing a type distinction between objects and properties
generates a hierarchy of entities or languages which threatens the view that we can
quantify over absolutely everything (Linnebo 2006, Rayo 2006, and Linnebo and
Rayo 2012). Since, as we have seen, this view plays an important role in motivating
pluralism, untyped pluralists might be thought to be on safer ground.
The aim of this article is to show that, despite its appeal, untyped pluralism should
be rejected. It is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument put forth by Timothy
Williamson (2003) and it clashes with a plural version of Cantor’s theorem. The
conclusion is that pluralists should postulate a type distinction between objects and
properties.
2 The regimenting language and its semantics
Untyped pluralism is a semantic view concerning how to specify the interpretations
of plural predication. To give it a precise formulation, we need to fix a suitable
regimenting language. For our purposes, it is enough to expand the standard language
of first-order logic by means of the vocabulary listed below. We call this language
LPL.1
A. Plural variables (vv,vv0,vv1, ...), roughly corresponding to the natural language
pronoun ‘they’. InLPL, plural variables exhaust the category of plural terms.
B. A plural existential quantifier (‘some things’) binding plural variables (∃vv,
∃vv0, ...). The plural universal quantifier is defined from the existential quanti-
fier in the usual way.
C. Symbols for collective plural predicates, with or without numerical subscripts:
P,Q,R... . Examples of collective plural predicates are ‘cooperate’, ‘gather’,
‘meet’, ‘outnumber’.2 Symbols for plural predicates are accompanied by a
double superscript of the form n[m] (0 < m ≤ n) indicating that the predicate
has n argument places of which exactly m are plural, i.e. reserved for plural
1This is a version of the language known as PFO+. See Rayo 2002 and Linnebo 2003.
2Collective plural predicates are contrasted with distributive plural predicates, such as ‘are prime’,
‘are students’, ‘visited Rome’. Here we can take distributive predicates to be those which license the
following kind of inference involving their corresponding singular form:
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terms.3 It is convenient to stipulate that plural argument places always precede
those occupied by singular terms. (For simplicity, I will often depart from
these conventions by leaving the arity unmarked and by allowing the order of
the arguments to reflect the order found in English.)
D. A distinguished binary predicate ≺ for plural membership, roughly corre-
sponding to the natural language ‘is one of’ or ‘is among’. Plural membership
will be treated as logical.
The recursive clauses defining a well-formed formula are the obvious ones.
Here are some examples of regimentation inLPL.
(1) Some shipmates gathered.
(1∗) ∃xx (S(xx) & G(xx)).
(2) Russell and Whitehead cooperated.
(2∗) ∃xx (∀y (y≺ xx↔ (y= r ∨ y= w)) & C(xx)).
(3) Some critics admire only one another.
(3∗) ∃xx (∀x(x≺ xx→Cx) & ∀x ∀y ((x≺ xx & A(x,y))→ (x 6= y & y≺ xx))).
It is useful to introduce abbreviations for plural inclusion (‘are among’) and for
plural identity:
(4) vv1 4 vv2 ↔de f ∀v (v≺ vv1→ v≺ vv2).
(5) vv1 ≈ vv2 ↔de f (vv1 4 vv2 ∧ vv2 4 vv1).
They are students she is one of them
she is a student
Distributive plural predicates in this sense can be obtained by paraphrase from their corresponding
singular forms. Instead of saying ‘they are students’, one may simply say ‘every one of them is a
student’. That is why distributive plural predicates have been omitted fromLPL.
3As presented above, LPL draws a rigid distinction between singular and plural predicates or
argument places. However, predication in natural language seems more flexible. Although some
predicates can only be combined grammatically with plural terms (e.g. ‘cooperate with one another’
or ‘are two in number’), other predicates can be combined grammatically with both singular and plural
terms (e.g. Frege’s example: ‘laid the foundations of spectral analysis’). To avoid complications, we
will focus on the first class of plural predicates. This will not affect the arguments presented below.
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Now that a basic regimenting language is in place, we can turn to illustrate the main
features of untyped pluralism, including its metaphysical underpinnings.
Metaphysically, the universe of the untyped pluralist is populated by entities be-
longing to a single ontological category: the objects. Properties are just objects of
a certain kind. They can be singular (p,q, ...) or plural (α,β , ...). Expressively, un-
typed pluralism can be formulated in a language that mirrors the regimenting one.4
So the untyped pluralist can avail herself of plural resources and speak plurally of
some or all objects.
On the traditional model-theoretic semantics, an interpretation is a thing, specif-
ically a set-theoretic function mapping the non-logical vocabulary to its semantic
values. In the new setting, it is quite natural to employ the plural resources available
in the metalanguage and construe a semantic interpretation as some things rather
than a single thing.5 Some things are collectively an interpretation if they code the
relevant semantic information about the domain of quantification and the interpreta-
tion of the non-logical vocabulary. In particular, if we postulate a pairing operation
subject to the usual constraints, the coding can be done by ordered pairs whose first
coordinate is an item of the non-logical vocabulary and whose second coordinate or
coordinates specify the semantic value or values of the first coordinate relative to the
given interpretation. An interpretation is then some ordered pairs satisfying certain
conditions.
Any admissible domain of quantification can be coded by pairing the symbol for
the existential quantifier with each element of the domain. For example, if we want
the domain of a given interpretation to consist of the objects a and b, the pairs (∃,a)
and (∃,b)—and no other pair of the form (∃,x)—will be among the things which
make up the interpretation.
Similarly, the semantic value of a predicate can be coded by the pair whose first
coordinate is the predicate itself and the second coordinate is the property assigned
to it. For instance, if a given interpretation assigns the plural property α to the the
plural predicate P, then the pair (P,α)—and no other pair of the form (P,x)—will be
among the pairs that make up the interpretation.
Finally, a variable assignment can be coded by some pairs where each variable
is paired with its semantic value or values. If we want a given variable assignment
to assign a, b, and c to the plural variable vv, then the pairs (vv,a), (vv,b), and
(vv,c)—and no other pair of the form (vv,x)—will be among those which make up
the assignment.
4In order to avoid potential confusion between object language and metalanguage, I will at least
distinguish the variables of the object language from those of the metalanguage. The former will be
exclusively v,v0, ...,vv,vv0, ... . All other variables (e.g. x, y, xx, yy, ii, and ss) will be used in the
metalanguage. The logical or defined symbols of the object language will do double-duty.
5For convenience, I will occasionally refer to some things as a plurality. This is just a shorthand
for a plural construction and should not be construed as involving any kind of set-like entity.
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It is important to notice that this departure from traditional model-theoretic se-
mantics allows the untyped pluralist to capture interpretations whose domain consists
of absolutely everything. An interpretation of this sort will be some pairs containing,
for every x whatsoever, the ordered pair (∃,x). The existence of these interpreta-
tions is secured by the principle of plural comprehension—a principle about what
pluralities there are—expressed by the schema:
∃x ϕ(x) → ∃xx ∀y (y≺ xx↔ ϕ(y)).
The details of the semantics will be provided in Appendix A. Here we introduce
the basic notions and notation employed in our discussion. In general, for any in-
terpretation I, any variable assignment S, and any non-logical expression E, JEKI
and JEKS will stand for the denotation or denotations of E according to I and S re-
spectively. A key model-theoretic notion is that of satisfaction of a formula ϕ by an
interpretation I and a variable assignment S, written I  ϕ [S]. As usual, satisfaction
is characterized inductively on the basis of the interpretation of terms and predicates.
In the specific case of untyped pluralism, an interpretation is given by some pairs and
so is a variable assignment. This is why we denote an interpretation and a variable
assignment, respectively, with the plural variables ii and ss. Crucially, for any predi-
cate A, JAKii is an untyped property—singular or plural depending on whether A is a
singular or a plural predicate.
3 Williamson’s argument
As noted above, pluralism has an important advantage over the set-theoretic approach
in that it is better suited to capture intuitive interpretations of the language in which
the quantifiers range over absolutely everything. Call absolute generality the view
that quantification over absolutely everything is possible. A Russell-style argument
put forward by Timothy Williamson shows there is a tension between absolute gen-
erality, the assumption that interpretations are objects, and a natural principle about
what interpretations there are. According to this principle, an atomic predicate of
the object language should be interpretable by any formula of the metalanguage (see
Williamson 2003 and, for discussion, Glanzberg 2004, Glanzberg 2006, Linnebo
2006, McKay 2006, and Parsons 2006).
One way to escape the argument—in effect the one recommended by Williamson—
is to give up the assumption that an interpretation is an objects. And untyped plural-
ism does just that: it constructs an interpretation as some things. However, as I will
argue in the next section, this move is ineffective when combined with the conception
of property underlying untyped pluralism. Let us begin by rehearsing Williamson’s
argument.
Let F be a one-place singular predicate. For the moment, we want to leave un-
decided exactly how the notion of interpretation should be construed. If the formula
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F(v) is satisfied by an interpretation I when v denotes the object x in the domain of
I, we say that F applies to x according to I. So ‘F applies to x according to I’ means
that
I  F(v) [V (v/x)],
whereV is any variable assignment suitable for I andV (v/x) is variant ofV in which
the singular variable v denotes x. Equivalently, ‘F applies to x according to I’ means
that JFKI(x).
An intuitively plausible view concerning interpretations is that an atomic pred-
icate F of the object language can be interpreted by any formula in the metalan-
guage. This yields a principle—call it the liberal principle of interpretations (LPI)—
according to which, for any formula of the metalanguage Φ(x) and any admissible
domain D,
(LPI) there is an interpretation I with domain D such that, for any x in D, F applies
to x according to I if and only if Φ(x).
For consistency, we assume throughout that I does not occur free in the comprehen-
sion formula Φ(x).
Absolute generality sanctions that the all-inclusive domain, the domain contain-
ing absolutely everything, is admissible. So LPI and absolute generality jointly entail
the principle—call it LPI∗—that, for every formula of the metalanguage Φ(x),
(LPI∗) there is an interpretation I with an all-inclusive domain such that, for every x
whatsoever, F applies to x according to I if and only if Φ(x).
Now LPI∗ is incompatible with the view that interpretations are objects. To see
this, let Ψ(x) be the metalanguage formula ‘x is not an interpretation such that F
applies to x according to x’. Suppose that semantic interpretations are objects, as
opposed to pluralities or higher-order entities. Apply LPI∗ to Ψ(x) and infer that
(i) there is an interpretation i with an-all inclusive domain such that, for every x
whatsoever, F applies to x according to x if and only if x is not an
interpretation according to which F applies to x.
Since interpretations are objects, we can take x in (i) to be i. An inconsistency ensues:
(ii) there is an interpretation i with an all-inclusive domain such that F applies to i
according to i if and only if i is not an interpretation according to which F
applies to i.
Williamson’s own suggestion is that semantic interpretations should be taken to
be second-order entities rather than objects. The liberal principle of interpretations
would then be reformulated in the following, second-order way. For every admissible
domain D and any formula of the metalanguage Φ(x),
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(LPI2) there is a second-order interpretation I with domain D such that, for every x
in D, F applies to x according to I if and only if Φ(x).
This blocks the argument by introducing a type distinction between I and x that
makes the substitution of I for x illegitimate (a pioneering formulation of the seman-
tics based on this notion of interpretation is given in Boolos 1985; see also Rayo and
Uzquiano 1999 and Rayo and Williamson 2003).
Of course, other responses to Williamson’s argument are possible. One may deny
absolute generality. However, this is not an attractive option for a pluralist, since
absolute generality plays an important role in motivating pluralism. Alternatively,
one may reject LPI. But this principle expresses an intuitively plausible requirement
on what interpretations there are: a given atomic predicate should be interpretable by
any formula of the metalanguage. It is not obvious why the above formulas should
be ruled out.
Does Williamson’s argument threaten untyped pluralism? This view construes a
semantic interpretation as some pairs rather than as an object. So one might think
that untyped pluralism should block the argument for the same reason Williamson’s
second-order move blocks it (see McKay 2006, pp. 147-54). But that is not the case.
If there is no type distinction between objects and properties, rejecting the view that
interpretations are objects in favour of the view that interpretations are pluralities is
not enough to avoid the argument, or a close variant of it. This is what I show next.
4 Extending the argument to plural predication
According to untyped pluralism, an atomic predication is true in an interpretation if
and only if, relative to that interpretation, the property denoted by the predicate is
instantiated by the object or objects denoted by the subject term. On this view, the
liberal principle of interpretations becomes in effect a comprehension principle for
properties. By asserting the existence of certain interpretations, it asserts the exis-
tence of the properties required for the existence of those interpretations. In the pres-
ence of absolute generality, however, the liberal principle of interpretations functions
as a naı¨ve comprehension principle for untyped properties, leading to contradiction.
Burgess (2008) and Nicolas (2008) have already expressed worries about the consis-
tency of the theory of untyped properties in connection with the semantics of plurals.
Here I spell out a way in which theses worries may be substantiated.
In the context of untyped pluralism, the liberal principle of interpretations takes
this form: for any admissible domain dd and any formula Φ(x) of the metalanguage,
(LPIUP) there are some pairs ii with domain dd such that, for every x≺ dd, F
applies to x according to ii if and only if Φ(x).
Assuming absolute generality, LPIUP entails that, for any formula Φ(x) of the met-
alanguage,
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(LPIUP∗) there are some pairs ii with an all-inclusive domain such that, for every x
whatsoever, F applies to x according to ii if and only if Φ(x).
We obtain a contradiction by replacing Φ(x) with ‘x does not instantiate x’. This
substitution yields that there are some things ii with an all-inclusive domain such
that, for every x whatsoever, F applies to x according to ii—i.e. JFKii(x)—if and
only if x does not instantiate x. Let p be JFKii, i.e. the singular property denoted by F
according to ii. Then, for every x, x instantiates p if and only if x does not instantiate
x. Since p is an object in the all-inclusive domain of quantification, we infer that p
instantiates p if and only if p does not instantiate p. This is Williamson’s argument
again.
A couple of remarks are in order. First, the argument can be blocked by banning
the formula ‘x does not instantiate x’ from the metalanguage. But this does not sit
well with the notion of untyped property. If properties are objects, there is nothing
problematic with the formula ‘x does not instantiate x’, which is perfectly grammati-
cal. Second, the problem cannot be avoided by merely giving up absolute generality.
The weaker assumption that we can quantify over all untyped properties is enough
to generate the argument.
Notice that, as stated, the argument does not involve plural predicates or plural
properties. It turns exclusively on the semantics of singular predication based on
untyped properties. This might suggest a response on behalf of the untyped plural-
ist. She could give up the idea that a singular predicate denotes a property, perhaps
embracing the view that a singular predicate denotes a plurality of things, the things
to which the predicate applies. On this view, F(t) is true in an interpretation if and
only if, relative to that interpretation, the object denoted by t is one of the objects
denoted by F . Of course, this response seems ad hoc and introduces an awkward
asymmetry between the semantics of singular predication and that of plural predica-
tion. But even if one is willing to pursue it, the prospects for untyped pluralism are
bleak. Williamson’s argument can be reformulated in terms of plural predication.
Let R(vv,v) be a two-place plural predicate of the object language taking a plural
and a singular argument. The intuitive considerations that motivate LPI also motivate
the following principle. For any admissible domain dd and any formula Φ(xx,x) of
the metalanguage,
(LPIP) there are some pairs ii with domain dd such that, for all xx4 dd and for
every x≺ dd, R applies to xx and x according to ii if and only if Φ(xx,x),
where saying that R applies to xx and x according to ii just means that
ii |= R(vv,v) [ss(vv/xx)(v/x)]
where ss are any assignment from the domain of ii.
So LPIP and absolute generality jointly entail that
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(LPIP∗) there are some pairs ii with an all-inclusive domain such that, for all xx and
for every x, R applies to xx and x according to ii if and only if Φ(xx,x).
We now obtain an inconsistency by replacing Φ(xx,x) with ‘x is not instantiated by
xx and x’.6
Giving up a uniform account of predication does not help the untyped pluralist
to avoid Williamson’s argument. If we can quantify over absolutely everything, or
at least over all untyped properties, untyped pluralism is at odds with the liberal
principle of interpretations. At this point the untyped pluralist might simply decide
to sacrifice the liberal principle of interpretations in spite of its intuitive plausibility.
Unfortunately, more trouble lies ahead.
5 A plural version of Cantor’s theorem
Even though it can capture interpretations with an all-inclusive domain of quantifi-
cation, there are still some intuitive interpretations of LPL that untyped pluralism is
unable to capture. Indeed, in the context of untyped pluralism the existence of some
intuitive interpretations is incompatible with a plural version of Cantor’s theorem.
Consider an atomic plural predication inLPL, say P(vv1). For any things xx, we
can conceive an assignment ss in which vv1 denotes xx and an interpretation ii with
an all-inclusive domain according to which P applies to xx and to no other plurality.
That is, for any things xx, there is, or there should be, an interpretation ii with an
all-inclusive domain such that
(6) ii |= P(vv1) ∧ ∀vv2 (vv2 6≈ vv1→¬P(vv2)) [ss(vv1/xx)],
where ss are any assignment from the domain of ii and ss(vv1/xx) are a variant of ss
in which vv1 denotes xx.
If we introduce a plural constant in the language, the point can be made even
more vividly. Add the plural constant cc to LPL, and extend the characterization of
an interpretation ii in the obvious way, i.e by requiring that JccKii be some things in
the domain of ii. Then, for any things xx, there is, or there should be, an interpretation
ii with an all-inclusive domain such that JccKii denotes xx and
(7) ii |= P(cc) ∧ ∀vv (vv 6≈ cc→¬P(vv)) [ss].
6Suppose that there are some pairs ii with an all-inclusive domain such that, for every xx and x, R
applies to xx and x according to ii—i.e. JRKii(xx,x)—if and only if x is not instantiated by xx and x.
Let α be the plural (relational) property denoted by R according to ii, i.e. α = JRKii. Then it follows
that, for every xx and x, α is instantiated by xx and x if and only if α is not instantiated by xx and x. Let
rr be any things. Since α is an object in the all-inclusive domain, we can infer that α is instantiated
by rr and α if and only if α is not instantiated by rr and α . Contradiction.
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where ss are, again, any assignment from the domain of ii.
Given the untyped pluralist’s account of plural predication, the existence of these
interpretations entails that, for any xx, there is an untyped property instantiated by xx
and by no other plurality. In symbols:
(8) ∀xx ∃α ∀yy (α(yy) ↔ yy≈ xx).
In other words, admitting the existence of the interpretations described just above
commits the untyped pluralist to the existence of a one-to-one mapping from the
pluralities to the plural properties.
However, this clashes with a plural version of Cantor’s theorem. The intuitive
idea is that, if there is more than one thing, there are more pluralities of objects than
objects. Therefore, there are more pluralities than untyped properties. As a result,
there cannot be a one-to-one mapping from the pluralities to the plural properties.
The way I just described the idea behind the plural version of Cantor’s theorem
is hardly coherent. Pluralities were treated as things, and I invoked a cardinality
comparison between pluralities and objects. The task now is to provide a suitable
rendering of the idea. Specifically, we must to prove a version of Cantor’s theorem
which uses only resources that are deemed acceptable by the untyped pluralist.
Let us start by recalling the set-theoretic version of Cantor’s theorem that will
serve as the model for the plural one. If R is a relation (i.e. a set of pairs), its domain
is the set {x : ∃y (x,y)∈ R}. An element x of the domain of R is said to code a set X if
and only if X = {y : (x,y) ∈ R}. Moreover, we say that R codes a set X if and only if
X is coded by some element of the domain of R. In one of its formulations, Cantor’s
theorem states that there is no relation that codes every subset of its domain.
Moving to the plural setting, we can adapt the terminology as follows. For any
plurality xx, the domain of xx—abbreviated as dom(xx)—are the things yy satisfying
this condition:
∀x (x≺ yy ↔ ∃y (x,y)≺ xx).
We then say of an object x in dom(xx) that it codes a plurality zz (or is the code of it)
when
∀y (y≺ zz ↔ (x,y)≺ xx).
Finally, xx is said to code yy if and only if there is an object in dom(xx) that codes yy.
Note that some pairs can code multiple pluralities at once. For instance, the pairs
(a,c),(a,d),(b,e),(b, f ) simultaneously code two pluralities: c and d, and e and f .
The domain of these pairs are a and b, where a is the code of c and d, and b is the
code of e and f .
Which pluralities can be coded by some pairs? Our plural version of Cantor’s
theorem describes a constraint on coding. Here is the statement of the theorem. A
proof is given in Appendix B.
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Plural Cantor. There are no things which code every subplurality of their domain if
their domain contains at least two objects:
¬ ∃xx (|dom(xx)| ≥ 2 & ∀yy (yy4 dom(xx)→∃x ∀y ((x,y)≺ xx ↔ y≺ yy))).7
An immediate corollary is the following.
Corollary. There are no things which code every plurality.
This spells trouble for the untyped pluralist.
As we have seen, admitting the existence of some intuitive interpretations com-
mits the untyped pluralist to
(8) ∀xx ∃α ∀yy (α(yy) ↔ yy≈ xx).
That is, for every plurality, there is a plural property uniquely associated with that
plurality. A relatively straightforward consequence of (8) via plural comprehension
is that there are some things which code every plurality (see Hossack forthcoming
for a rejection of plural comprehension related to the present argument; see also the
discussion in Linnebo 2010). In particular, if a property is instantiated by a unique
plurality, then it can serve as the code of that plurality. But this violates our plural
version of Cantor’s theorem.8 So the untyped pluralist cannot admit the existence of
those interpretations.
Construing properties as untyped comes at the cost of sacrificing the adequacy
of the semantics. Since the ability to capture all intuitive interpretations of the
language—including those with an all-inclusive domain—plays an important role
7Second-order analogues of this result are proved in Bernays 1942 and Shapiro 1991. For discus-
sion, see Rayo 2002. Other plural versions of Cantor’s theorem are found in Yi 2006 and Hawthorne
and Uzquiano 2011.
8Proof. Suppose that (8) holds. Then consider the open formula of the metalanguage
ϕ(x) ≡ ∃α ∃z (x= (α,z) ∧ ∃zz (z≺ zz ∧ α(zz))),
which asserts that x is a pair whose second coordinate z is among some things zz which jointly in-
stantiate its first coordinate. Clearly, there is some x such that ϕ(x). For example, take two objects
a and b (say two cooperative individuals), and let α be a plural property that they jointly instantiate
(e.g. that of cooperating). Then the pair (α,a) satisfies the formula, i.e. ϕ(x) for x = (α,a). Since
the formula ϕ(x) is instantiated, we can apply plural comprehension to it and obtain the plurality of
objects satisfying the formula:
∃xx ∀y (y≺ xx↔ ϕ(y)).
Call these things aa. We want to show that aa code every plurality. Let yy be any plurality. It follows
from (8) that there is a property α dependent on yy such that, for every xx, α(xx) if and only if xx≈ yy.
By the characterization of aa, for every y, (α,y)≺ aa just in case y≺ yy. So aa code the plurality yy,
and α is their code. Since yy was an arbitrary plurality, it follows that aa code every plurality, which
contradicts the plural version of Cantor’s theorem.
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in motivating pluralism, the untyped version of the view should be rejected. By in-
troducing a type distinction between objects and properties, both problems raised in
this article can be sidestepped. The type distinction blocks Williamson’s argument
just as Williamson’s own second-order response does. Moreover, if properties are no
longer objects, it is consistent to hold that there is a one-to-one mapping from the
pluralities to the plural properties and that there are more pluralities than objects. So
the existence of the interpretations described at the beginning of this section does
not clash with Cantor’s theorem. I conclude that pluralists should embrace a type
distinction between objects and properties.9
Appendix A: untyped pluralism
In this appendix, we provide a more detailed presentation of untyped pluralism.
Some things ii are an interpretation if they meet the following conditions.
1. There is some x such that (∃,x) ≺ ii. (This means that the domain of the
interpretation must be non-empty.) The domain of ii—which will be denoted
by d(ii)—are exactly the things satisfying:
∀x (x≺ d(ii)↔ (∃,x)≺ ii).
2. For any singular constant c, there is a unique x such that (c,x) ≺ ii, and x ≺
d(ii). (A singular constant denotes one and only one object in the domain.)
3. For any singular predicate Fn, there is a unique singular property p such that
(Fn, p) ≺ ii. Moreover, for every x1, ...,xn, if p(x1, ...,xn), then x1, ...,xn ≺
d(ii). (A singular predicate denotes one and only one singular property which,
if instantiated, is instantiated by objects in the domain.)
4. For any plural predicate Pn[m], there is a unique plural property α such that
(Pn[m],α)≺ ii. Moreover, for every xx1, ...,xxm,x1, ...,xn−m, if
α(xx1, ...,xxm,x1, ...,xn−m),
9For helpful comments and discussion, I wish to thank Andrew Arana, Ben Caplan, Bruce
Glymour, Keith Hossack, Shen-yi Liao, Øystein Linnebo, Tom McKay, David Nicolas, Agustı´n Rayo,
Sam Roberts, Stewart Shapiro, Scott Tanona, William Taschek, Neil Tennant, Gabriel Uzquiano, Sean
Walsh, an anonymous reviewer and the editors of Mind. My research has been partly funded by a Eu-
ropean Research Council Starting Grant (2241098) with Øystein Linnebo as the principal investigator.
I am very grateful for this support.
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then
xx1, ...,xxm 4 d(ii) and x1, ...,xn−m ≺ d(ii).
(A plural predicate denotes one and only one plural property which, if instan-
tiated, is instantiated by objects and pluralities of objects in the domain.)
Next one needs to characterize the notion of variable assignment. Some things ss are
a variable assignments relative to a domain d(ii) just in case:
5. For any singular variable v, there is a unique x such that (v,x) ≺ ii, and x ≺
d(ii).
6. For any plural variable vv, there is an object x such that (vv,x) ≺ ii and x ≺
d(ii). Such an object need not be unique, as vv might denote many things,
those appearing as the second coordinates of pairs among ss of the form (vv,y).
However, those things must all be in d(ii). That is, for every y, if (vv,y) ≺ ss,
then y≺ d(ii).
Variants ss(v/x) and ss(vv/xx) of a variable assignment ss with respect to v and vv
are defined in the usual way.
For any interpretation ii and variable assignment ss, and for any non-logical ex-
pression E, let JEKii and JEKss indicate the denotation or denotations of E according
to ii and ss, respectively. If t is a singular term, we use the following abbreviation:
JtKii/ss =
{JtKii if t is a constant,JtKss if t is a variable.
We are now are ready to characterize the central notion of satisfaction. This is
defined as a relation Sat(ϕ, ii,ss)—written as ii  ϕ [ss]—among a formula ϕ of
LPL, an interpretation ii, and a variable assignment ss from d(ii). The following
clauses implicitly define this relation:
(i) If ϕ is of the form t = r, ii  ϕ [ss] if and only if JtKii/ss = JrKii/ss.
(ii) If ϕ is of the form t ≺ vv, ii  ϕ [ss] if and only if JtKii/ss ≺ JvvKss.
(iiia) If ϕ is of the form Fn(t1, ..., tn),
ii  Fn(t1, ..., tn) [ss] if and only if JFnKii(Jt1Kii/ss, ...,JtnKii/ss).
(iiib) If ϕ is of the form Pn[m](vv1, ...,vvm, t1, ..., tn−m),
ii  Pn[m](vv1, ...,vvm, t1, ..., tn−m) [ss] if and only ifJPn[m]Kii(Jvv1Kss, ...,JvvmKss,Jt1Kii/ss, ...,Jtn−mKii/ss).
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(iv) If ϕ is of the form ∃vψ , ii  ϕ [ss] if and only if, for some x ≺ d(ii), ii 
ψ [ss(v/x)].
(v) If ϕ is ∃vvψ , ii  ϕ [ss] if and only if, for some xx4 d(ii), ii  ψ [ss(vv/xx)].
(vi-xi) The clauses for negation and for the binary connectives are the obvious ones.
Finally, we can characterize the notion of logical consequence and logical truth. For
any set of sentences Γ and any sentence σ , σ is a logical consequence of Γ (Γ  σ )
just in case, for any interpretation ii and variable assignment ss from d(ii), if ii γ [ss]
for any member γ of Γ, then ii  σ [ss]. A sentence σ is a logical truth in the
special case in which /0  σ . This completes the presentation of the untyped pluralist
semantics.
Appendix B: proof of Plural Cantor
Plural Cantor. There are no things which code every subplurality of their domain if
their domain contains at least two objects:
¬ ∃xx (|dom(xx)| ≥ 2 & ∀yy (yy4 dom(xx)→∃x ∀y ((x,y)≺ xx ↔ y≺ yy))).
Proof. Suppose for reductio that there are some things xx such that dom(xx) contains
at least two objects and xx code every subplurality of dom(xx).
Under this supposition, there is z ≺ dom(xx) such that (z,z) ⊀ xx. This will be
proved as a separate lemma below. Now, through plural comprehension using xx as
parameter, we can reproduce the diagonal argument behind the traditional version of
Cantor’s theorem. That is, since there is z≺ dom(xx) such that (z,z)⊀ xx, by plural
comprehension we obtain:
∃yy ∀y (y≺ yy ↔ (y≺ dom(xx) & (y,y)⊀ xx)).
Call these things bb. Note that bb 4 dom(xx). Since xx code every subplurality of
dom(xx), xx code bb, i.e.
∃x (x≺ dom(xx) & ∀y ((x,y)≺ xx ↔ y≺ bb)).
By the characterization of bb, this entails in turn that, for some r ≺ dom(xx),
∀y ((r,y)≺ xx ↔ (y≺ dom(xx) & (y,y)⊀ xx)).
Thus, in particular,
r ≺ dom(xx) & ((r,r)≺ xx ↔ (r ≺ dom(xx) & (r,r)⊀ xx)).
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Therefore,
(r,r)≺ xx ↔ (r,r)⊀ xx.
Contradiction. We conclude that there are no things which code every subplurality
of their domain if this contains at least two objects.
Lemma. If xx code every subplurality of dom(xx) and |dom(xx)| ≥ 2, then there is
z≺ dom(xx) such that (z,z)⊀ xx.
Proof. As a preliminary, note that, for any object x, there are some things such that
x and only x is among them:
∃yy ∀y (y≺ yy ↔ y= x).
The existence of this ‘degenerate’ plurality follows from plural comprehension, using
x as a parameter.10 Let eex stand for the things such that x and only x is among them.
Then, by definition, if y≺ eex, then y= x.
Now suppose that xx code every subplurality of dom(xx) and that |dom(xx)| ≥ 2.
Also, suppose for reductio that, for every z ≺ dom(xx), (z,z) ≺ xx. The main idea
for the proof is that these assumptions force every object x in the domain to be the
code of eex. So there are no objects left in the domain to serve as the codes of the
‘non-degenerate’ pluralities, contrary to the fact that xx code every subplurality of
dom(xx). Let us make this more precise.
Let x be any object in dom(xx). Since xx code every subplurality of dom(xx), xx
code eex. Let cx be the code of eex, i.e.
∀y ((cx,y)≺ xx ↔ y≺ eex).
Then, clearly, (cx,x) ≺ xx. However, we are assuming that for every z ≺ dom(xx),
(z,z) ≺ xx. Since cx ≺ dom(xx), it follows in particular that (cx,cx) ≺ xx. Thus
cx ≺ eex. Hence cx = x. This means that, for any object x in dom(xx), x is the code
of eex.
Since |dom(xx)| ≥ 2, there are a1 and a2, distinct objects in dom(xx). Plural
comprehension entails the existence of the plurality comprising exactly a1 and a2.
That is,
∃yy ∀y (y≺ yy ↔ ( y= a1 ∨ y= a2)).
Call this plurality aa. Since xx code every subplurality of their dom(xx), xx code aa.
Let caa be the code of aa. By the definition of a code, (caa,a1)≺ xx, (caa,a2)≺ xx,
and, for every y, if (caa,y)≺ xx, then y= a1 or y= a2. But, recall, we are assuming
10The proof could be easily revised to accommodate the requirement that a plurality contain always
more than one thing (but see, e.g., Yi 2005 for an argument against this requirement).
Untyped Pluralism 17
that, for every z ≺ dom(xx), (z,z) ≺ xx. So (caa,caa) ≺ xx. Therefore, caa must be
either a1 or a2.
However, we have shown above that an object x in dom(xx) is the code of eex.
Thus caa can be neither a1 nor a2. For, if caa = a1, caa must be the code of eea1 and
cannot be the code of aa. Likewise, if caa = a2, caa is the code of eea2 and cannot
be the code of aa. Contradiction. So there must be some z in dom(xx) such that
(z,z)⊀ xx.
References
Beall, JC (ed.), 2003: Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press.
Bernays, Paul, 1942: ‘A System of Axiomatic Set Theory, IV.’ Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 7, pp. 133–45.
Boolos, George, 1984: ‘To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values
of Some Variables).’ Journal of Philosophy, 81, pp. 430–50.
———, 1985: ‘Nominalist Platonism.’ Philosophical Review, 94, pp. 327–44.
Burgess, John, 2008: ‘Review of Thomas McKay. Plural Predication.’ Philosophia
Mathematica, 16, pp. 133–40.
Glanzberg, Michael, 2004: ‘Quantification and Realism.’ Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, 69, pp. 541–71.
———, 2006: ‘Context and Unrestricted Quantification.’ In Rayo and Uzquiano
2006, pp. 45-74.
Hawthorne, John and Uzquiano, Gabriel, 2011: ‘How Many Angels Can Dance on
the Point of a Needle? Trascendental Theology Meets Modal Metaphysics.’ Mind,
120, pp. 53–81.
Higginbotham, James, 1998: ‘On Higher-Order Logic and Natural Language.’ In
Smiley 1998, pp. 249-75.
Hossack, Keith, 2000: ‘Plurals and Complexes.’ British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 51, pp. 411–43.
———, forthcoming: ‘Sets and Plural Comprehension.’ Journal of Philosophical
Logic.
Kreisel, Georg, 1967: ‘Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs.’ In Lakatos 1967,
pp. 138-86.
Untyped Pluralism 18
Lakatos, Imre (ed.), 1967: Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics. North Hol-
land.
Lewis, David, 1991: Parts of Classes. Basil Blackwell.
Linnebo, Øystein, 2003: ‘Plural Quantification Exposed.’ Nouˆs, 37, pp. 71–92.
———, 2006: ‘Sets, Properties, and Unrestricted Quantification.’ In Rayo and
Uzquiano 2006, pp. 149-78.
———, 2010: ‘Pluralities and Sets.’ Journal of Philosophy, 107, pp. 144–64.
Linnebo, Øystein and Rayo, Agustı´n, 2012: ‘Hierarchies Ontological and Ideologi-
cal.’ Mind, 121, pp. 269–308.
MacBride, Fraser, 2005: ‘The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Meta-
physics?’ Mind, 114, pp. 565–614.
McKay, Thomas J., 2006: Plural Predication. Oxford University Press.
Nicolas, David, 2008: ‘Mass nouns and plural logic.’ Linguistics and Philosophy,
31, pp. 211–44.
Oliver, Alex and Smiley, Timothy, 2001: ‘Strategies for a Logic of Plurals.’ Philo-
sophical Quarterly, 51, pp. 289–306.
———, 2005: ‘Plural Descriptions and Many-Valued Functions.’ Mind, 114, pp.
1039–58.
Parsons, Charles, 2006: ‘The Problem of Absolute Genearlity.’ In Rayo and
Uzquiano 2006, pp. 203-19.
Rayo, Agustı´n, 2002: ‘Word and Objects.’ Nouˆs, 36, pp. 436–64.
———, 2006: ‘Beyond Plurals.’ In Rayo and Uzquiano 2006, pp. 220-54.
Rayo, Agustı´n and Uzquiano, Gabriel, 1999: ‘Toward a Theory of Second-Order
Consequence.’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40, pp. 315–325.
Rayo, Agustı´n and Uzquiano, Gabriel (eds.), 2006: Absolute Generality. Oxford
University Press.
Rayo, Agustı´n and Williamson, Timothy, 2003: ‘A Completeness Theorem for Un-
restricted First-Order Languages.’ In Beall 2003, pp. 331-356.
Resnik, Michael, 1988: ‘Second-Order Logic Still Wild.’ Journal of Philosophy, 85,
pp. 75–87.
Untyped Pluralism 19
Schein, Barry, 1993: Plurals and Events. MIT Press.
Shapiro, Stewart, 1991: Foundations without Foundationalism. A Case for Second-
order Logic. Oxford University Press.
Smiley, Timothy (ed.), 1998: Philosophical Logic. Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy, 2003: ‘Everything.’ Philosophical Perspectives, 17, pp. 415–
65.
Yi, Byeong-Uk, 1999: ‘Is Two a Property?’ Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 163–90.
———, 2005: ‘The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part I.’ Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 34, pp. 459–506.
———, 2006: ‘The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part II.’ Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 35, pp. 239–88.
